Introduction 1 1
In settling the so-called "Irish question" between 1912 and 1922, two outcomes which could not have been foreseen at the outset were that six of Ireland's thirty-two counties would be excluded from the jurisdiction of a Dublin parliament and that a majority of Irish nationalists from those counties would consent to time-limited exclusion. This article has two main aims. The first is to examine the thinking behind the Government's decision to exclude six full Ulster counties from the jurisdiction of the proposed Irish Home Rule parliament. The second is to chart the gradual elicitation of a deeply reluctant consent for exclusion, first from the Irish Nationalist political leadership and then from the nationalist communities affected. As nationalists saw it, they were being asked to endorse a strictly time-limited measure. However, explicit assurances that the exclusion would be permanent were simultaneously included in government dossiers and, by 1916, given in writing to Ulster Unionists in a move that would ultimately collapse the efforts of the British government to solve the Irish question in 1916. The eventual resolution of the issue would take another five and a half years and cost of several thousand lives through the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in the south and sectarian pogroms in the north of the island. 2 On 11 April 1912, the third attempt to pass Home Rule legislation for Ireland was introduced to parliament at Westminster. At the end of September 1912, Ulster Unionists had formalised their opposition to the Bill through the Ulster's Solemn League and Commons. 13 Ronan Fanning notes how British and Ulster Unionists saw the Parliament Act as "revolutionary" and, that "perhaps we have our one and only chance of defeating it by counter-revolutionary means." 14 The Covenant, a year on 6 In the closing days of September 1913, a series of events occurred which jump-started discussions on the Ulster crisis following months of relative stasis. Firstly, on 24 September, six leading Unionists led by Sir Edward Carson put their name to a document proclaiming a provisional government for Ulster in the event of the province "being Forcibly Subjected to a Nationalist Parliament and Executive." 15 
7
That weekend, a rally of 12,000 members of the Ulster Volunteer Force assembled outside Belfast at the Balmoral Agricultural Showgrounds. During the demonstration, two flags were flown. Firstly, a Union Jack, believed to be the largest ever in existence, was unfurled. Second, a new flag for the breakaway province of Ulster was flown for the first time. It had "a red hand and stars of each county of the new state of Ulster." 16 In the wake of these two events -the launch of a provisional government and a show of strength by Ulster's rebel army -the British Unionist leader Andrew Bonar Law met with Winston Churchill and told him the Tory party were now open to holding a conference and that they had Carson on board. 8 The next day, on 28 September, at the other end of Ireland, the leader of the Home Rule movement, John Redmond, visited the ancestral home of the nationalist hero Daniel O'Connell and, en route, gave a firm statement of his party's position. He unambiguously rejected the idea that Ulster could be excluded from any Home Rule settlement. 17 While holding the door open to negotiation on any issue save that of exclusion, Redmond managed to stoke rather than ease tensions when he told his audience that "the whole agitation in Ulster was but a gigantic and preposterous absurdity." 18 
9
Irish nationalism was at this point dominated by the Irish Parliamentary Party, the pledge-bound elected MPs who consistently held approximately three quarters of Ireland's seats in the House of Commons. Around John Redmond, the party chairman, his three closest advisers were John Dillon, MP for Mayo East and the former leader of the majority faction of Irish nationalism in the 1890s, T. P. O'Connor, the IPP's only MP to sit for a British constituency in the strongly Irish city of Liverpool. The fourth and youngest member of this inner circle was Joseph Devlin, Secretary of the United Irish League from 1904, President of the Ancient Order of Hibernians from 1905, and, since 1906, MP for his native West Belfast, a Catholic enclave within the otherwise Protestant majority city. 19 L[loyd] G[eorge] certainly sees all the difficulties of our assenting to the exclusion of Ulster -I mean, of course, in saying Ulster the four counties: -the desertion of our friends etc. ... It is evident to me that the Tory Party as a whole, is somewhat alarmed by the position of Carson and would grasp at any compromise which would save their faces. 21 11 O'Connor found that Dillon was away so, the following day, he wrote to Devlin explaining how:
[Lloyd George] had proposed at the beginning of the struggle that Ulster sh[oul]d get this option [of a plebiscite], feeling confident then that it would be refused, and that he still thought this would have been wise tactics. 22 [We] discussed quite calmly and amicably our difficulty in agreeing to a proposal which would look like the betrayal of our fellow-Nationalists in Ulster. 23 12 At a time when much of these policies was being articulated from speaking platforms and in the press, the government urgently sought an opportunity to sit down with the Irish party and talk. On 13 November, Asquith wrote to Redmond requesting a meeting explaining that he was … anxious to have a talk with you […] I feel that in your speech at Newcastle you will be careful not to close the door to the possibility of an agreed settlement. I will only add, for the moment, that I am by no means sanguine that anything of the kind can happen. Nor need I assure you of the firm and unshaken determination of my colleagues and myself to attain with your help our common object. 27 17 On 17 November 1913, two meetings were held at Downing Street. In the morning, the Prime Minister spent approximately an hour with Redmond. In the afternoon, Lloyd George met Dillon with Percy Illingworth in attendance. In his meeting with Redmond, the Prime Minister reported the contents of the conversation he had recently had with Bonar Law. Asquith then discussed Ulster in frank terms with Redmond. He expressed his concern, which was shared by the Cabinet, that it was now necessary to work towards " some settlement which would avoid bloodshed in Ulster." 28 Asquith warned Redmond that:
the Carsonites were in possession of at least five thousand rifles -probably moreand his information from the War Office with re-[gard] [sic] to the attitude of the Army was of a serious character, pointing to the probability of very numerous resignations of commissions of Officers in the event of the troops being used to put down an Ulster insurrection. 29 18 In his meeting with John Dillon, Lloyd George disclosed a separate but related revelation: that the authorities had uncovered 95,000 rounds of ammunition in Belfast and were working towards their seizure. 30 19 Three points of major significance arise from these meetings. Firstly, by November 1913, Ulster Unionists were showing their teeth and putting force behind their rhetoric through major munition importations. 31 Secondly, the British government was fully aware of these shipments. Finally, and most importantly, these facts were being used by the British government in order to turn the screw on the Irish party and to extract concessions from Redmond and Dillon. 20 Although both Asquith and Lloyd George were keen to stress that they in no way envisaged offering concessions to Ulster immediately, the direction favoured among the Cabinet was a scheme which had been drawn up by Lloyd George. It would have seen Ulster (or a portion thereof) excluded from the jurisdiction of a Home Rule parliament for a period of five years after which time Ulster would automatically move from Westminster to Dublin control. All that the Government were asking at this point was that the Irish party agree to the principle of this concession and that they would not discount the possibility of compromise in the future. As Asquith put it to Redmond, "we must, of course, keep our hands free, when the critical stage of the Bill is ultimately reached, to take such a course as then in all circumstances seems best calculated to safeguard the fortunes of Home Rule." 32 21 Whereas an official shift in in the Irish party leadership's stance would not come until March 1914, in acquainting Redmond with the facts of the Ulster situation, Asquith had succeeded in winning another convert, in principle only, to the idea that a special accommodation for Ulster would have to be made. According to Lloyd George's memoranda of his interviews with Dillon, he extracted an even more emphatic approval for the idea of temporary exclusion "inasmuch as it was accompanied by the carrying into law of Home Rule for the rest of Ireland". 33 F.S.L. Lyons questions the credibility of Lloyd George's interview, believing a situation where Dillon was more amenable to conciliation than Redmond to be improbable to the point of disbelief. 34 However, further evidence suggests Lloyd George's memoranda should not be rubbished entirely. In a letter to O'Connor after his meeting, Dillon stated that "if we were forced to a decision now on the question of temporary exclusion of Ulster -our decision must be a flat negative." 35 However, this does not mean that Dillon had rejected the principle of temporary exclusion. Lloyd George had been keen to stress Dillon's apprehension over the timing of an announcement of the Irish party's approval to time-limited exclusion. Dillon's concern was over 'when' rather than 'if' the Irish party would agree to the concessions. 22 Referring to his scheme for temporary exclusion, Lloyd George's memo noted that: [Dillon] was anxious the Irish leaders should be free during the next few months to state that no proposal of the kind had been made to the other side, and that they (the Irish leaders) had not assented to such a scheme. He thought that if put forward at the last moment, when the Bill was going through, it [temporary exclusion] might be tactically a very wise plan to propose, and that then the Irish leaders might carry it in Ireland. 36 23 All Dillon wished to clarify in his subsequent letter to O'Connor was that, if forced into a decision now, the party would have to reject any idea of exclusion. In this same letter to O'Connor, he confirmed this, stating that when negotiating with Lloyd George: "I kept perfectly open mind [sic] to consider the proposition [of temporary exclusion] when the time came and assented to accept it or reject it -after giving full weight to all the circumstances of the time." 37 24 Thus, it can be demonstrated that the Government had, by the end of November, succeeded in gaining approval, in principle, from three of the four members of the Irish party's inner leadership for temporary exclusion. 38 This was a major coup and marked a fundamental shift in the stance of the Irish party.
The last hurdle: Devlin 25 Lloyd George had noted Dillon's concern that, while Dillon personally saw the merits of Lloyd George's scheme, "he anticipated difficulty with Devlin, whom he described as being perfectly irreconcilable in the matter of the exclusion of Ulster." 39 Although Dillon did not explicitly commit to any attempt to convert Devlin, Lloyd George recorded that " [Dillon's] attitude was friendly to the proposal of the Cabinet, and it was clear that if left to him to decide, there would be no difficulty in obtaining the assent of the Irish Nationalists." 40 It is thus not sensationalist to state that Redmond, Dillon, and O'Connor were keeping Devlin in the dark following their meetings at Downing Street in November. 41 Having been converted to acceptance of time-limited exclusion, they now had to break the news to their Belfast colleague, but this would have to be done sensitively. Dillon eventually be converted by his colleagues, and that Dillon would be pivotal to this conversion. 45 27 February witnessed the culmination of the crisis. In a rather panicked note to Dillon on 2 February, Redmond explained that Asquith was coming under extreme pressure from his own party to make concessions on Ulster and that a split in the Cabinet was possible. Even more gravely, Redmond said that Asquith had told him how the King was "thoroughly frightened" by the Ulster situation. Because of all this, Asquith told Redmond that it was " quite essential for him [Asquith] to make an explicit offer to Ulster at once". 46 28 Redmond, Dillon Drawing the border and the origins of permanent exclusion 31 In the wake of Devlin's conversion, Nationalist acceptance for the principle of strictly time-limited exclusion was complete. However, this fact was not public knowledge. Redmond, Dillon, O'Connor and Devlin met with Asquith and Lloyd George on 2 March and, in a memorandum subsequently submitted by Redmond, the Irish party formally agreed to "the standing out for three years by option of the counties of Ulster as the price of peace ." 54 32 The government now quietly began to make contingency plans by drawing up the area to which exclusion might apply. It is in this phase the modern Irish border began to take shape and was first put on paper. The groundwork began immediately and, on the same week that Devlin came on side (3 March), a government white paper was drafted. Almost immediately, the three year time limit was pushed out to six and the revised white paper was made public when Asquith moved the second reading of the Home Rule Bill on 9 March. 55 As per Lloyd George's plan, it proposed that, on petition and on a county-bycounty basis, Ulster counties would be allowed to exclude themselves from the operation of the Home Rule Bill for a yet-to-be-determined number of years. 56 Exactly a month later, on 6 April, a new set of proposals was circulated to Cabinet. One of the most significant alterations between the March white paper and the April Cabinet proposal was that "the six excluded counties [were] not to be included in the Irish unit of self-government unless by their own consent". 57 The government persisted for over two more years in claiming to the Irish party leadership that the proposals for exclusion were strictly time-limited. However, this document shows that, from April 1914 onwards, the British government agreed to the principle that no move would be made to coerce or impose the reunification of Ireland after its supposedly temporary partition. Given the absolute majority of Protestants -which roughly but not entirely mapped onto unionism -the possibility of any permutation of Ulster territory opting by ballot for inclusion in a Home Rule Ireland after the period of exclusion had elapsed was remote in the extreme. 33 Although the Lloyd George scheme was predicated on the principle of four-county exclusion, the lines of demarcation for the excluded area were still very much up in the air throughout the period from March to July 1914. At the Irish Office, Chief Secretary Augustine Birrell began requesting information and proposals for a boundary line for the excluded area simultaneous to the printing of the government's white paper. 58 Birrell drew upon the expertise of three senior civil servants to help determine the shape of the exclusion zone. 34 Dougherty was an Ulster-born Presbyterian and a pro-Home Rule Liberal. Bailey, meanwhile, had been secretary to the royal commission on public works in 1886 and had travelled the length and breadth of the country in this capacity. 59 He reminded the Chief Secretary of his "rather intimate knowledge" of religious opinions in Ulster. 60 As for Robinson, he came from an Anglo-Irish Protestant (Anglican) ascendancy family and was "bred for the public service." 61 If Robinson's 1923 memoir is to be believed, he had a close personal relationship with Birrell and was a trusted adviser to him throughout Birrell's term as Chief Secretary (1908-16). 62 Robinson was seen by Birrell as an expert on the political geography and demographics of Ireland. Virginia Crossman claims that Robinson's knowledge of the Irish localities was "unrivalled within Dublin Castle". 63 Robinson had played a leading role in framing and implementing the 1898 Local Government Act. This included the re-division of Ireland's 159 poor law unions into 213 rural districts contiguous with county borders. In the process, the county borders were themselves redrawn for half of Ireland's counties. 64 As such, Robinson had been central to drawing the very boundaries which, sixteen years later, were at the centre of the Ulster impasse. 35 In his memoirs Robinson, who admitted to having been "tarred with the Unionist brush and … not a trustworthy person from a Nationalist point of view", said that Birrell saw him as "a sort of liaison officer for legislative work between [Birrell] and the Unionists." 65 Presently, the extent to which Robinson looked out for Unionist interests in proposing his boundary line will be examined. Birrell set 6 May as the deadline for receipt of proposals from his three advisers.
Ulster Exclusion and Irish Nationalism: Consenting to the Principle of Partit...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXIV-2 | 2019
The Three Schemes The Bailey Scheme 36 Taking W. F. Bailey first, although his maps have been separated from their accompanying correspondence, it is possible to reconstruct from his description and tables the boundaries of the excluded area he proposed. 66 Of the three, the Bailey scheme was the most disruptive and paid little heed to existing administrative boundaries. Instead, Bailey relied on physical geography to craft a more visible border. In Fermanagh, Bailey cut straight through both of the county's parliamentary divisions, running his boundary line directly up the middle of the Erne waterways system. 67 Of the three schemes, Bailey's was the only one in which his accompanying notes made no acknowledgement of the scheme's temporary nature. 68 Thus, while Nationalists were still working under the premise that they had consented to temporary exclusion, one official was drawing two clearly identifiable and separate regions using west-Ulster's waterways to create a solid and discernible line of separation. 69 37 Bailey's scheme was the most rushed of the three and included some questionable calls.
Bailey proposed the inclusion of the entire parliamentary division of North Monaghan within the unionist area. 70 Monaghan was a county nobody else was even considering in their permutations and the portion Bailey chalked for exclusion had a two-thirds Catholic majority. Because his boundary line sliced through existing administrative units, it was impossible for Bailey to accurately estimate how many of the almost 1.2 million people he planned to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Home Rule parliament were Catholics and Protestants. 71 The Robinson Scheme 38 By far the most thorough of the three exclusion schemes was that devised by Sir Henry Robinson. In drawing his boundary line, Robinson took local government boundaries as his operational unit, a method the Undersecretary would later dismiss as unworkable. 72 The Robinson scheme proposed the exclusion of 1,178,586 persons from the operation of the Home Rule Act. This amounted to 26.85 percent of the population of Ireland and, at £4,545,708, 28.58 percent of Ireland's land by valuation. 73 Robinson's exclusion zone was two-thirds Protestant and one-third Catholic. Of the three, Robinson's boundary line was the only one which explicitly considered infrastructural factors such as road and rail connections. 74 Even though Robinson's line was not ultimately adopted, his justifications are highly instructive in explaining the policy thinking underpinning the final shape of the Irish border, especially the inclusion of the two Catholic majority counties, Tyrone and Fermanagh, and the majority Catholic city of Derry. 39 On the eastern end of the boundary line, the Robinson scheme showed considerably more sympathy to Catholics than simple six-county exclusion. Robinson 76 In Fermanagh, Robinson's justification was even more illuminating.
Here he justified the inclusion of an area with a 3,000-strong Catholic majority because " there has been more money spent on armament and drilling here than in any part of the county and these Enniskillen and Lisnaskea Protestant farmers are the most bloodthirsty set of ruffians I know". 77 Fearing a contagion effect in Cavan and Monaghan, Robinson defended the exclusion of these districts as "there would be no peace or settlement along the whole border line if these people were left out." 78 Bailey had applied the same logic to justify the inclusion of North Monaghan and the whole of Tyrone, the Protestant minorities of which he described as being "very strong and … better drilled and armed than in almost any part of the Province." 79 41 Despite all of his careful work and calculations, Robinson virtually cast all this aside towards the end of his letter to Birrell stating: "I expect you will find that the Ulstermen's minimum will be six entire counties in and no option … Personally, I agree about no option [putting the matter to a plebiscite]. It will indeed mean riots when this crucial issue is announced". 80 The Dougherty Scheme 42 Of Birrell's three advisers, the most reluctant was his second-in-command, Undersecretary Sir James Brown Dougherty. While Bailey and Robinson replied with detailed, even enthusiastic suggestions on the 6 th , Dougherty replied on the 7 th making apologies that a prior engagement had delayed him and saying how it would be "a difficult, if not impossible job to construct these pens" and that "the policy of exclusion, whatever plan may be adopted, bristles with difficulties and at the moment I confess I do not see how they are to be surmounted." 81 43 Dougherty provided his full memorandum five days later on 11 May with his comments on the merits and demerits of dividing the province by local government areas, parliamentary divisions, and full counties. 82 Of these, Dougherty's preference was for the scheme which was ultimately adopted: the county option. Dougherty's rationale focused largely on the administrative headache he foresaw in dealing with an otherwise excluded area in which local government boards, county councils, and existing parliamentary constituencies would be split across two jurisdictions. 83 44 All three schemes recommended that Ulster's second city, Derry, which had a Catholic majority, be put into the exclusion zone. Robinson argued that it was "impossible to keep the maiden city out of the parent County". 84 46 Despite declaring for whole-county option, Dougherty fudged his answer to the question of whether four or six counties should be excluded. His rationale for four-county exclusion was based on the fact that such a scheme would create "a tolerably compact area" but he seems on balance to have conceded that six counties would be the more realistic outcome due to the fact that "it is difficult to see how the Ulster Covenanters in the four included Counties can abandon their brethren in Tyrone or Fermanagh." 86 No more than Robinson, Dougherty was conceding to the power of force and threat in making his decisions over Ulster. 47 In light of the above, following the Nationalist leadership's accession to the principle of strictly time-limited exclusion in March, Dublin Castle favoured full six-county exclusion.
Despite the strong preference in Dublin for full county exclusion, it has been suggested that the other permutations were not entirely cast aside. Brendan O Donoghue makes a convincing case that copies of various maps, including Robinson's 6 May map, were circulated among attendees at the Buckingham Palace Conference in July (discussed subsequently) when it came to discussing permutations for an area for exclusion that might be acceptable to both Nationalists and Unionists. 87 48 As the table below illustrates, the exclusion of six full counties was the least sympathetic of the available options. However, from the perspective of administrators full county option had the advantage of being the least disruptive from a governance perspective. However, the power of unionism was the overriding factor. 50 At the sessions of the conference, the question of time limit was set aside by mutual agreement and the opposing parties decided instead to focus on the proposed area for exclusion. 89 By engaging in this exercise, Redmond and Dillon further confirmed their acceptance of the principle that a certain portion of Ireland would have to be excluded from Home Rule for an undetermined length of time. 51 The Buckingham Palace Conference is often seen as the moment at which the partition of Ireland began to take shape. 90 However, it has been shown here that the leadership of the Irish party had conceded in private to the principle of exclusion months before this point. In a sense, the conference was an attempt to draw both sides into the open, forcing them to make public the concessions they had already made in private. If this was the Government's intention, it backfired spectacularly. Buckingham Palace was remembered for the intransigence of both parties. As Asquith recorded, Redmond and Carson faced 105 Ultimately, this divide would push this latter group towards the emergent revolutionary republicanism of Sinn Féin whereas Devlin held sway among his faithful followers in Belfast. 57 In the context of understanding the shape of the modern Irish border and in charting the path which led to nationalist acceptance of it, the 1916 Belfast conference represents a crucial juncture and the final milestone in the trajectory which this article intends to chart. The temporary exclusion which had been agreed to in principle by the Irish party leadership in March 1914 was now endorsed by a representative assembly of nationalists from the affected area. Although partition would take years to become a reality, all of its essential parts had been assembled by the summer of 1916.
Conclusion 58
The period 1912-16 witnessed a complete reversal in Nationalist policy on the Ulster question. Beginning with intransigent rhetoric about an indivisible island, by 1916 both the leaders and the followers of the Irish party had conceded willingly to the temporary partition of Ireland. However, the seeds of permanency were sown by their stance. 59 Nationalists at all times acknowledged the principle of consent over coercion. In practice, this signalled permanent exclusion and this maxim had been written into a secret cabinet proposal as early as 6 April 1914. Consent was part of the nationalist vision for a unified and united Ireland under Home Rule. They did not want to win a united Ireland by bloodshed. Despite their professed adherence to the principle of consent, nationalists clung to the idea that exclusion would be subject to strict legal time limits. Their logic was predicated on the idea that they could win unionists in the excluded territory over by their exemplary governance. However, so long as nationalists held on to the reasonable and democratic idea that Ulster should not be compelled by force to enter the jurisdiction of a Home Rule parliament, the overwhelming likelihood of permanent exclusion remained a fact. 60 Regarding the area for exclusion, if the principle of consent was firmly established in April 1914 then the rationale for excluding six full Ulster counties was determined by the Irish Office in May 1914. Following the impasse at the Buckingham Palace Conference in July, exclusion was hardwired into any future settlement. The point here is that both the shape and nature of the Ulster solution were all-but-set prior to the outbreak of the First World War. Nationalist delegates from the six counties were forced to go through the rigmarole of giving their approval to Lloyd George's scheme a full two years after it had been determined to be the only remaining viable option. 61 The negotiation of the Ulster question should be seen as an example of the pre-war secret diplomacy which Woodrow Wilson derided in the advent of the Paris Peace Conference. In Ulster's case, all the major players knew most (but not necessarily all) of the parameters long before these were put to the populations who would have to live with the consequences. The manufacturing of majorities prior to the holding of any plebiscite should likewise sound a note of caution to historians of Europe after the Armistice. 62 Irish historiography charts the origins of partition to the 1920 Government of Ireland Act; the establishment of the devolved Northern Irish state in July 1921; and the signing and ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty between December 1921 and January 1922. What this article demonstrates is that, six years before any of this, the scheme and shape of a permanently excluded six-county Ulster had been determined by a man who was then the Chancellor of the Exchequer but would go on to become Prime Minister from December 1916 until October 1922. In this later phase, Lloyd George oversaw the implementation of all of these ideas and witnessed the decline, departure, or death of many of the participants he had tangled with in the first phase of the crisis including Asquith, Carson, Devlin, Dillon, and Redmond. 
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